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SIX THESES ON INTERPRETATION 
Cass R. Sunstein * 
This discussion will come in two parts. First, I will make a 
somewhat unconventional constitutional argument about how the 
privacy cases should be understood. Second, I will venture a few 
observations about the character of this argument and about the 
nature of legal interpretation. 
In essence, my substantive argument is that the Supreme 
Court's privacy cases should be understood as involving not only 
privacy, but also, and much more fundamentally, discrimination, 
usually on the basis of sex. The applicable constitutional provision 
is the equal protection clause, not the due process clause. I suggest 
that this claim should be understood as a legal argument; that inter-
pretation is critical rather than conventional, and inevitably so; that 
the claims of legal indeterminacy depend on crudely positivist no-
tions of interpretation; that analogies to interpretation in theology, 
literature, and philosophy offer limited help; and that it is time to 
tum away from questions about the nature of interpretation and 
toward more in the way of substantive legal argument. 
I 
The statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut forbade the use 
of contraceptives by married couples. The statute was defended as 
a means of preventing extramarital sex. Its origins suggested that it 
was intended to ensure that sex would occur only for purposes of 
procreation. 
In the real world, it is principally women rather than men who 
are responsible for contraception. The consequences of a prohibi-
tion on use of contraceptives are visited principally on women. A 
system that denies use of and access to contraceptives will disadvan-
tage women uniquely, and relative to men, by forcing them to 
choose between carrying the child to term with the attendant disa-
bilities, or having an abortion with its emotional and physical risks. 
• Karl N. Llewelyn, Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School 
and Department of Political Science. Some of the arguments offered here are spelled out in 
more detail in Sunstein, Revisiting Constitutional Privacy (unpublished manuscript). 
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Such a system calls for a powerful defense by the state. In the Gris-
wold case, no such defense was forthcoming. 
Under current law, of course, the equal protection clause is 
aimed primarily at impermissible motivations, not primarily at so-
cial subordination as such. Anti-contraceptive laws do not classify 
on the basis of sex; it is therefore necessary to prove discriminatory 
motive on the part of the state. Under the best reconstruction of 
current law, a discriminatory motive exists if and only if a state 
would not have done what it did if the distribution of benefits and 
burdens among the relevant groups were reversed. I If the state's 
decision would have been the same regardless of which group was 
helped and which hurt, it would be fair to say that it was neutral 
with respect to sex (or race). If the state's decision would have been 
different, it is infected by a discriminatory motive. This analysis of 
impermissible motivation has the advantage of being a fully plausi-
ble approach to the constitutional criterion of equality. 
In the context at hand, the question of discriminatory intent 
becomes: Would a state have imposed restrictions on the right to 
use contraceptives if the costs of pregnancy were visited on men 
rather than women? There are two possible answers to this ques-
tion. The first is, Clearly no. No legislature would punish men in 
this way for having had sex. 
Another response is that the question is itself not susceptible to 
an answer. Most counterfactuals are based on situations that have 
some analogue in the real world. But in the counterfactual in ques-
tion, the problem is that if men could become pregnant, they would 
not be men. The inability to become pregnant is one of the defining 
characteristics of being a man. In this view, the question is so spec-
ulative and otherworldly that it is not sensible even to pose it. 
Undoubtedly this view has a good deal of plausibility to it. But 
it also suggests reasons to be extremely skeptical about-perhaps to 
abandon altogether-the inquiry into discriminatory intent. In a 
large class of cases, the intent inquiry, phrased as an equality ques-
tion, will suffer from precisely these problems. A plausible substi-
tute for the discriminatory intent test, one also having roots in 
constitutional law, would ask whether the practice at issue contrib-
uted to the social subordination of a disadvantaged group. Under 
that substitute approach, which I cannot spell out in detail here, 
Griswold was rightly decided as an equality case. 
It is time to summarize what has been a quite simple point. 
The disabilities imposed by laws that restrict access to contracep-
1. I rely in the next few paragraphs on the analysis in Strauss, Discriminating Intent 
and the Timing of Brown, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1989). 
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tives are visited principally on women. If social subordination is the 
target of the equal protection clause, such laws are presumptively 
unconstitutional, and the presumption cannot easily be rebutted. If 
the equal protection clause is aimed at discriminatory motive, there 
is good reason to believe that such laws are also unconstitutional. If 
the discriminatory intent standard is not satisfied, the problem is 
with the standard itself, and such laws are unconstitutional under 
the most plausible alternative approach as well. 
Arguments of this sort apply not only to Griswold, but to Ei-
senstadt and Carey as well. Roe v. Wade and its successor cases are 
easier in some ways but harder in others. Antiabortion statutes are 
of course directed exclusively at women. Thus they amount to de 
jure discrimination on the basis of sex. It will not do to suggest that 
the discrimination is merely in terms of effects. The disadvantaged 
class consists exclusively of women. There is authority in the 
Supreme Court distinguishing sex discrimination from discrimina-
tion against pregnant people, but this distinction is hard to take 
seriously. 
It is sometimes suggested that antiabortion laws do not treat 
people who are similarly situated differently; hence they are said not 
to discriminate on the basis of sex. But the Aristotelian criterion 
("treat likes alike") is unhelpful when biological differences are at 
work, or when the claim is that equality requires the differently situ-
ated to be treated differently. In cases of biological difference, legal 
disabilities that make those differences count raise questions of dis-
crimination, at least when the removal of those disabilities would 
tend in the direction of equality. If women were permitted to con-
trol their own reproductive processes, more in the way of equality 
would result: neither men nor women would be subject to the risk 
of pregnancy from sex. Antiabortion laws thus represent a legal 
disability that removes a possible source of equality, or that create a 
source of inequality. They are therefore a form of sex discrim-
ination, unconstitutional unless this can be defended quite 
persuasively. 
Here too the case can be understood in terms of social subordi-
nation or, more conventionally, discriminatory intent. There is no 
doubt that compulsory childbearing is an element of the social sub-
ordination of women, imposing on them a burden nowhere imposed 
on men; and the burden has significant consequences in the real 
world. Under an intent test, the simple point is that it is highly 
doubtful that antiabortion laws would exist if men could become 
pregnant. If this conclusion is to be resisted, it is because the ques-
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tion is itself an implausible one, not susceptible to reasoned answer; 
and in that case we have reason to reject the test itself. 
Even if the case is understood in this way, it is not clear that 
Roe was rightly decided. Perhaps the state could justify the disabil-
ity placed on women as a means of protecting an extremely impor-
tant interest: fetal life. But the absence of the imposition of any 
comparable burden on men, and the real-world consequences of se-
lective abortion regulation, increase the state's difficulties in defend-
ing its statute. Selective restrictions of abortion, varying from one 
state to another, would produce an economically and racially 
skewed system that would preserve far fewer fetal lives, and impose 
more disabilities on women, than might be expected. 
I might add that the central problem in Bowers v. Hardwick 
was also one of equal protection. Justice Stevens rightly struck this 
theme in his dissent. Prohibitions on homosexual conduct deny to 
gay people sexual liberty that the majority allows to itself: it is prin-
cipally for this reason that anti-sodomy laws are constitutionally 
problematic. 
II 
What does it mean to say that the argument just offered is a 
constitutional argument? In what sense do arguments of this sort 
represent "law"? Notably missing from the argument is explicit 
emphasis on some of the conventional sources of constitutional ar-
gument-language, history, structure. On the other hand, the argu-
ment is not simply moral theory or normative argument in the 
abstract. The claim that the privacy decisions should be understood 
as involving sex discrimination is not a claim that the best political 
theory would understand them as such. The claim is instead that 
the equal protection clause is best interpreted to treat the cases in 
these terms. That claim in tum depends on a theory of the meaning 
of the notion of constitutional equality. That theory attempts to 
link race and sex discrimination-understanding both practices, for 
constitutional purposes, as a reflection either of a kind of prejudice 
or of social subordination. The argument offered above receives 
some support from cases suggesting that neutrality as between 
blacks and whites and women and men is a constitutional require-
ment, at least outside of the setting of affirmative action. It is but-
tressed as well by cases suggesting that the equal protection clause 
is designed to combat social subordination. 
Considerations of this sort lead me to six basic claims about 
constitutional interpretation. 
1. The asserted dispute between constitutional "perfection-
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ism" -embodied perhaps in the idea that the Constitution should 
be interpreted so as to coalesce with the best political and moral 
ideals-and "hard law" approaches to constitutional law is based 
on confusions that might be cleared up by paying attention to actual 
constitutional argument. It would be a large mistake to suggest that 
constitutional claims of the sort made here-even if, for example, 
the intent of the framers, narrowly understood, is put to one side-
put everything up for grabs. Whether the argument is to be ac-
cepted or rejected will depend on the reasons offered in its behalf. 
Those reasons-as in Brown v. Board of Education-involve the 
meaning of constitutional equality in light of the decided cases and 
the appropriate conception of the constitutional text. To ask 
whether Brown is "hard law" or personal preference is to assume a 
dichotomy that misdescribes the process. The same is true of con-
stitutional argument quite generally. 
2. There is little difference between law in the ordinary 
sense-as understood in the common law and in many cases of stat-
utory construction-and constitutional law as represented in argu-
ments like that offered above. The sources of legal argument are in 
both cases the same, broadly speaking. The principal difference is 
that institutional constraints make the Supreme Court quite reluc-
tant to invalidate legislative and executive decisions, and properly 
so. Moreover, precedent plays a different role in constitutional and 
common law cases; there are other differences as well. But in terms 
of interpretive methodology, there is no sharp break. 
3. The "indeterminacy" thesis, at least as frequently under-
stood, misconceives the process of constitutional argument (and 
legal argument generally). I assert that the argument offered above 
is correct. So to assert is not to deny that the argument depends 
partly on judgments of value. It is sometimes said, as against inter-
pretive approaches to law, that if something depends on judgments 
of value, all bets are off. But this idea turns on crudely positivist 
notions of social science. The argument made above is not in any 
simple sense a mere assertion of personal preference. If it is wrong, 
it must be because constitutional argument, properly understood, 
makes it wrong; and that is a question that must be discussed. 
4. There are large differences between legal interpretation on 
the one hand and religious interpretation, literary criticism, and 
moral argument on the other. In some respects these analogies may 
be illuminating. But one cannot think about questions of interpre-
tive practice in the abstract. The appropriate nature of interpreta-
tion turns on the purposes for which one is interpreting. Law is 
coercive; federal judges are unelected; some sources of interpreta-
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tion are permissible and others are not; the Supreme Court operates 
in a highly pluralistic society; the rulings of the Court are authorita-
tive-all of these features distinguish legal interpretation from inter-
pretive practices in literature, theology, and philosophy. 
5. Legal interpretation is critical rather than conventional; 
and this is inevitable. It is often misleading or unhelpful to under-
stand legal interpretation as an appeal to an "interpretive commu-
nity" or to conventional understandings of what words mean. The 
interpretive community is usually quite diverse. There is no con-
ventional understanding of whether the equal protection clause is 
violated by a law banning abortion. The courts must choose among 
competing plausible understandings. But to repeat: to say this is 
not to say that judges are at sea, or that there are not right and 
wrong answers. And it is important to emphasize that correctness 
and incorrectness will be highly contextual. The privacy cases raise 
equal protection issues only contingently; they might be analyzed 
quite differently in a world of gender equality. 
6. What is needed for the immediate future is less discussion 
of whether constitutional interpretation is law, and more attention 
to how constitutional argument operates in concrete cases. A re-
lated point: What is needed is more and better in the way of sub-
stantive constitutional argument. The privacy cases, I claim, 
involve impermissible discrimination. Why should they not be un-
derstood in those terms? 
